



Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac

A Critical History of Operations in Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania from the Commencement to the Close of the War, 1861-1865.

By WILLIAM SWINTON.

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THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.

Hooker's Brilliant Strategy in Crossing the River-Lee Outmaneuvered-Foeder's Astonishing Collapse at the Time for Supreme Action-All the Advantages Willfully Thrown Away.

LEE OUTMANEUVERED.

The opposing armies had long so long faced each other on the banks of the Rappahannock, that it may well be supposed there remained no point in the problem of the attack or defense of that line that had not been thoroughly considered. Since the battle of Fredericksburg and the subsequent attempts to pass the Rappahannock, Lee had made such dispositions as to guard all the available crossings of that stream. At the time the operations resulting in the battle of Chancellorsville began, he occu-

to their arms. Such as were carried away by the current were caught by a cavalry picket stationed below. After dark the crossing being continued all night, huge bonfires were kindled, and by the aid of the light thus cast over the wide scene, the troops filed over the river, and next morning all were across. The soldiers were in the highest spirits; for, acute judges of military movements as the rank and file always are, they knew that the march they had made was one of those pregnant marches that are in themselves victories; so they gaily headed toward Chancellorsville, which was the assigned point of concentration and which they reached in the afternoon of the 26th.

While the three corps, whose movements I have indicated, had passed far up the Rappahannock to Kelly's Ford, the Second

tions as though with that intent were made during the 25th and 26th, and as, by the night of the 26th, the faint had subsided its purpose, and a lodgment had been gained at Chancellorsville, Sickles's Corps was directed to join the force at that point—Sedgwick, with two corps, meanwhile remaining below to await developments on the right.

HOOKE'S CONFIDENCE.
The success that had crowned these operations, which, as they were executed out of sight of the enemy, may be called the strategy of the movement, inspired the army with the highest hopes and greatly elevated the commander. On reaching Chancellorsville on Thursday night, he issued an order to the troops, in which he announced that "the enemy must either ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his defenses and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him." This boast, so much in the style of Hooker, was amplified by the whole tenor of his conversation. "The rebel army," said he, "is now the legitimate property of the Army of the Potomac. They may as well pack up their haversacks and make for Richmond; and I shall be after them," etc., etc. (14). And, indeed, there was much in the aspect of affairs to justify jubilant expectations; for, of the two lines of retreat open to Lee, Hooker already held both of them by Gordonsville, and threatened that by Richmond. The former he could not take up; and, if he chose the latter, he would have Hooker with five corps on his flank, and Sedgwick with two corps pressing his rear. The bright promise of these initial operations was clouded by but one fact—the cavalry column which was to cross the Rappahannock on the right of the infantry, and cut Lee's communications at the same time that the infantry was operating on his army, had been so delayed by the rise of the river that it did

and this voluntary act on the part of the latter devolves upon him the responsibility for all the consequences flowing therefrom. Chancellorsville, where Hooker had drawn up his forces, lies 10 miles west and south of Fredericksburg, with which it is connected by two excellent roads—the one macadamized, the other plank. It stands in the midst of a region extending for several miles south of the Rappahannock and westward as far as Mine Run, localized, in common parlance, as "the Wilderness"—a region covered with dense woods and thickets of black-jack oak and scrub pines, and than which it is impossible to conceive a field more unfavorable for the movements of a grand army. But, advancing from Chancellorsville toward Fredericksburg, the country becomes more open and clear as you approach the latter place, and affords a fine field for the use of all arms.

Now, there is evidence that Gen. Hooker did not originally design to allow himself to be shut up in this tangled thicket; and, on Friday morning, May 1, he began to push forward his columns to gain the open country beyond the bounds of the Wilderness. The two roads running from Chancellorsville to Fredericksburg (the plank road on the right and the turnpike on the left) unite near Tabernacle Church, about midway between the former two places; and to the left of the turnpike there runs a river road leading along the Rappahannock to Banks's Ford. On the latter road two divisions of Meade's Corps were pushed out, while on the turnpike Sykes's Division of the same corps was thrown forward, and Slocum's Corps was given the same direction on the plank road. This was a movement to take up a line of battle about two and a half miles in front, preparatory to a simultaneous advance along the whole line, set down for 2 o'clock in the afternoon. (16). I shall trace briefly the experience of each column.

The left column, composed of the divisions of Griffin and Humphreys, moved out on the river road for five miles, and came within sight of Banks's Ford, without encountering any opposition.

STRONG POSITION OBTAINED EASILY.
The center column, made up of the division of Sykes, supported by the division of Hancock, advanced on the turnpike, and on gaining the first of a series of ridges that cross the roads between Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg, some three miles in advance of the former place, the mounted men in front were met and driven in by the enemy. This small force resisted handsomely, riding up and firing all the while, but at last, when the three columns received orders from the Commanding General to withdraw back to Chancellorsville. With mingled amazement and incredulity, this command was received by the officers, who went to beg Hooker to allow the army to push on and hold the front thus gained. (18). It was urged in the warmest terms that the occupation of that fine position would uncover Banks's Ford, thus, as I have said, giving easy communication with Sedgwick; that it secured the dominating heights which, if not held, would instantly be seized to his great disadvantage by the antagonist; that it would take the army beyond the densely wooded region in which maneuvering was impossible, and that it would enable it to command the open country on the opposite slope of the Fredericksburg heights soon to be carried by Sedgwick. It was in vain that these considerations, whose supreme importance must be apparent from a moment's glance at the topography of the region, were urged by his ablest advisers. Hooker had assumed the defensive and was waiting for the enemy to attack him "on ground of his own selection." From that moment he flung away the initiative with all its mighty gains and far-reaching hopes.

FATALLY INFELICITOUS MOVEMENTS.
It is difficult to account for a line of action so faulty in a conjuncture of circumstances in which the fitting course was so manifestly marked out. Having studied the case at the time when a spectator of these events, I have returned to its examination in the light of the whole body of evidence, and still I cannot find the remains still unsolved. Still I cannot find the elements of war, but the moment he confronted his antagonist, he seemed to suffer collapse of all his powers, and after this his conduct, with the exception of two or two momentary flashes of talent, was marked by an incomprehensible feebleness and faultiness; for in each crisis, his action was not only faulty, but fatal. In the first, the worst that could have been adopted. It is probable that Hooker never expected that Lee would turn to meet him, but that, that, disconcerted by the suddenness and success of the primal stroke, he would bet a hasty retreat southward toward Richmond. When, on the contrary, he found his antagonist making a rapid charge from the rear, he was left to accept the gaze of battle in the Wilderness, the General whose first stride had been that of a giant, shrunk to the proportions of a dwarf.

CHOSE WORST POSITION.
The columns that had advanced so handsomely to the Fredericksburg heights returned to Chancellorsville, and Lee showed that this was a position relatively inferior to that which had been gained, it remains to add that it was absolutely a bad position. It had been taken up in the morning toward the close of the previous day, without any prospect of fighting a pitched battle upon it; it had several commanding positions in its front for the enemy to occupy.

16. Hooker's Circular Order, May 1: Report of the Conduct of the War, second series, vol. i, p. 124.

17. Warren: Report of Operations connected with the Chancellorsville Campaign, p. 12. "The ground on which I had posted Hancock in support of Sykes, was about one and a half miles from Chancellorsville, and was a fine position for the army to hold. Upon receiving orders from Gen. Hooker to come in, I sent Maj. Burt to him urging that, on account of the great advantages of that position, it should be held at all hazards. The reply was to return at once. Gen. Warren also went in person and urged the necessity of holding it."—Couch: Report of Chancellorsville. For confirmation of the same, see Warren: Report of Operations connected with the Chancellorsville Campaign, p. 12. "The ground on which I had posted Hancock in support of Sykes, was about one and a half miles from Chancellorsville, and was a fine position for the army to hold. Upon receiving orders from Gen. Hooker to come in, I sent Maj. Burt to him urging that, on account of the great advantages of that position, it should be held at all hazards. The reply was to return at once. Gen. Warren also went in person and urged the necessity of holding it."—Couch: Report of Chancellorsville.

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19. Warren: Report of Operations connected with the Chancellorsville Campaign, p. 12.

20. Warren: Report of Operations connected with the Chancellorsville Campaign, p. 12.

21. Warren: Report of Operations connected with the Chancellorsville Campaign, p. 12.

22. Warren: Report of Operations connected with the Chancellorsville Campaign, p. 12.

23. Warren: Report of Operations connected with the Chancellorsville Campaign, p. 12.

24. Warren: Report of Operations connected with the Chancellorsville Campaign, p. 12.

25. Warren: Report of Operations connected with the Chancellorsville Campaign, p. 12.

Port Histories of Notable Regiments

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FORTY-FOURTH NEW YORK INFANTRY—"ELLSWORTH'S AVENGERS."

BARTLETT'S BRIGADE—GRIFFIN'S DIVISION—FIFTH CORPS.

COMPANIES.	KILLED AND DIED OF WOUNDS.			DIED OF DISEASE, ACCIDENTS, IN PRISON, &c.			Total Enrollment.
	Officers.	Men.	Total.	Officers.	Men.	Total.	
Field and Staff.....	1	1	2	1	1	2	15
Company A.....	1	28	29	1	14	15	158
B.....	1	14	15	1	17	18	144
C.....	1	18	19	1	15	16	137
D.....	1	13	14	1	16	17	162
E.....	1	18	19	1	14	15	152
F.....	1	20	21	1	16	17	166
G.....	1	21	22	1	16	17	182
H.....	1	17	18	1	13	14	161
I.....	1	13	14	1	13	14	156
K.....	1	16	17	1	10	11	152
Totals.....	4	178	182	2	145	147	1,585

Total killed and wounded, 643; total of missing and captured, 79; died in Confederate prisons, 10.	
BATTLES.	K. & M. W.
Yorktown, Va.....	1
Hanover C. H., Va.....	34
Gaines's Mill, Va.....	17
Malvern Hill, Va.....	21
Manassas, Va.....	13
Fredericksburg, Va.....	7
Chancellorsville, Va.....	1
Middleburg, Va.....	1
Gettysburg, Pa.....	36
BATTLES.	K. & M. W.
Rappahannock Station, Va.....	3
Wilderness, Va.....	12
Spotsylvania, Va.....	21
North Anna, Va.....	1
Bethesda Church, Va.....	6
Petersburg, Va.....	5
Poplar Spring Church, Va.....	2
Place unknown.....	1

Present, also, at Seven Days; Antietam; Shepherdstown; Mine Run; Totopotomoy; Weldon Road.

NOTES.—The enlisted men in this regiment were the finest of any in the service. They were recruited from every county in the State, in conformity to requirements calling for unmarried, able-bodied men, not over thirty years of age, not under five feet eight inches in height, and of good moral character. The men were of a high order of intelligence, and when the regiment was organized it was found that the average age was twenty-two, and the average height five feet ten and one-half inches. The men wore a zouave uniform during the first year of their service. At Hanover Court House, its first battle, the Forty-fourth made a gallant fight, losing 27 killed and 59 wounded; at Gaines's Mill—Lieutenant-Colonel Rice commanding—it lost 5 killed, 22 wounded, and 29 missing; and at Malvern Hill, 11 killed, 84 wounded, and 4 missing, out of 225 who were engaged. The regiment was then in Butterfield's Brigade of Morell's (1st) Division. Two new companies (C and E) joined in October, 1862 (one of them composed of students from the State Normal School at Albany), and took the place of two companies which had been consolidated with the others. At Gettysburg, then in Vincent's Brigade, Barnes's Division, the Forty-fourth was one of the first regiments to seize and hold Little Round Top, meeting its greatest loss there; casualties, 20 killed, 82 wounded, and 3 missing; total, 111. At Manassas, Major Freeman Conner commanding, the regiment lost 5 killed, 48 wounded, and 18 missing, out of 12 officers and 148 men in action; at the Wilderness, it lost 4 killed and 63 wounded; and at Spotsylvania, 8 killed, 48 wounded, and 9 missing. Mustered out September 24, 1864.

EIGHTY-THIRD PENNSYLVANIA INFANTRY.

BARTLETT'S BRIGADE—GRIFFIN'S DIVISION—FIFTH CORPS.


COMPANIES.	KILLED AND DIED OF WOUNDS.			DIED OF DISEASE, ACCIDENTS, IN PRISON, &c.			Total Enrollment.
	Officers.	Men.	Total.	Officers.	Men.	Total.	
Field and Staff.....	4	1	5	1	1	2	20
Company A.....	1	23	24	1	12	13	172
B.....	1	22	23	1	16	17	116
C.....	1	20	21	1	10	11	188
D.....	1	25	26	1	11	12	162
E.....	1	31	32	1	19	20	236
F.....	1	26	27	1	16	17	200
G.....	1	22	23	1	14	15	167
H.....	1	28	29	1	22	23	173
I.....	1	45	46	1	9	10	193
K.....	1	28	29	1	22	23	181
Band.....	1	1	2	1	1	2	...
Totals.....	11	271	282	2	151	153	1,808

Total of killed and wounded 671; died in Confederate prisons (previously included), 23.	
BATTLES.	K. & M. W.
Hanover Court House, Va.....	1
Gaines's Mill, Va.....	61
Malvern Hill, Va.....	50
Manassas, Va.....	26
Fredericksburg, Va.....	5
Chancellorsville, Va.....	1
Gettysburg, Pa.....	18
Guerrillas, Va., December 10, 1863.....	1
Wilderness, Va.....	20
North Anna, Va.....	2
BATTLES.	K. & M. W.
Spotsylvania, Va., May 8th.....	57
Spotsylvania, Va., May 10th.....	2
Bethesda Church, Va.....	2
Cold Harbor, Va.....	1
Siege of Petersburg, Va.....	15
Peebles's Farm, Va.....	10
Dabney's Mills, Va.....	5
Gravelly Run, Va.....	1
White Oak Road, Va.....	3
Five Forks, Va.....	1

Present, also, at Yorktown; Mechanicsville; Peach Orchard; Savage Station; White Oak Swamp; Glendale; Antietam; Shepherdstown; Aldie; Rappahannock Station; Mine Run; Totopotomoy; Weldon Railroad; Hatcher's Run; Appomattox.

NOTES.—The Eighty-third encountered more fighting and lost more men in battle than any other Pennsylvania regiment; in fact, its loss in action was exceeded by only one other in the entire Union army. None of its losses were caused by blunders, none occurred in disastrous routs; its dead always lay with their faces to the enemy. With its "twin regiment," the Forty-fourth New York, it was assigned to Butterfield's Brigade, Morell's Division, Fifth Corps. Colonel McLane was killed at Gaines's Mill, and Vincent fell at Gettysburg while in command of the brigade. At Gaines's Mill, the regiment lost 46 killed, 51 wounded, and 99 missing; four days later, at Malvern Hill, it lost 33 killed, 115 wounded, and 18 missing—a total of 362, out of the 554 present at Gaines's Mill. At Manassas, under Lieutenant-Colonel McCoy, it lost 14 killed, 72 wounded, and 11 missing, out of 224 officially reported by McCoy as present and engaged. It had the honor, at Gettysburg, of participating in the brilliant maneuver of its brigade—Vincent's—in seizing Little Round Top at a critical moment, helping materially to save the fortunes of the day. At Spotsylvania, its casualties amounted to 21 killed, 119 wounded, and 24 missing; total, 164. General McClellan once publicly pronounced the Eighty-third "one of the very best regiments in the army."

EDITORIAL NOTE: The above pages are reproduced from Col. Fox's famous book, "Regimental Losses." Other pages, giving short histories of notable regiments, will appear from week to week. It is hoped the appearance of these short histories will stimulate comrades to send in material for the preparation of more complete histories of their regiments than have yet appeared.



THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN.

med in force the heights south of the Rappahannock from Skinker's Creek to United States Ford (a distance of about 25 miles), having continuous lines of infantry parapets throughout, and his troops so disposed as to be ready to concentrate on any given point. Interspersed along these lines of entrenchments were battery emplacements, advantageously located, for sweeping the hill-slopes and bottom-lands over which an attacking force would have to march—the crests of the main hills being from three-quarters of a mile to a mile and a half from the river's margin. (10). To gain the immediate banks opposite the center of the enemy's line was, however, practicable in several places where the high ground on the north side approached the stream and enabled artillery to command it; but the prospect of their success, in the absence of heights, from past experience, hopeless. The Confederate right flank was so disposed that Lee was secure against attack from that direction; while above his left, at United States Ford, the junction of the Rappahannock with the Rappahannock involved the passage of the former also in any attempt to turn that flank. Indeed, the execution of a movement to turn the Confederate left by the Union army, at such a distance from its base, and with heavy pontoon and artillery trains, and in face of means of information such as Lee had at his command, seemed very unlikely, and he gave himself very little concern about it.

HOOKE'S PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.
Difficult as was the problem in all its aspects, and debarred as Hooker was from making a direct attack, the most promising enterprise was nevertheless an operation against Lee's left. This, after much cogitation, Hooker resolved to execute, and he formed a very bold plan of operation. He determined to make his main movement against the enemy's left by a strong column, that by a wide detour up the Rappahannock to Kelly's Ford (27 miles above Fredericksburg) should pass round Lee's flank to Chancellorsville; while he resolved to mask this movement by forcing the Rappahannock near Fredericksburg with a considerable body, and ostentatiously threatening direct attack. He expected that the successful execution of the turning operation would have the effect to cause Lee to abandon his defenses along the Rappahannock, when battle might be given with great advantage. In cooperation with this attack, he prepared a powerful cavalry column of 10,000 sabers, destined to operate simultaneously on Lee's railroad communication with Richmond.

MARCH TO CHANCELLORSVILLE.
The turning column was composed of three corps—the Fifth (Meade), the Eleventh (Howard), and the Twelfth (Slocum). Marching on the morning of Monday, April 27, this force reached the vicinity of Kelly's Ford on the following day. During the night of the 28th, and next morning, the passage of the Rappahannock was accomplished by a pontoon bridge, laid by a small observing force; the three corps, being divided into two columns, moving on parallel roads, took up the line which it was necessary first to cross the Rappahannock. The right column (Eleventh and Twelfth Corps) struck the Rappahannock at Germania Ford, (11). The left column (Fifth Corps) at Ely's Ford. The stream proved to be barely fordable; but celerity of movement being an object of the first importance, it was immediately resolved to cross the troops by wading—an arduous and somewhat dangerous feat; for the stream is rapid, and even at the fords came up to the shoulder. The men, however, plunged in—the greater part stripping and carrying their clothes and cartridges-boxes on their bayonets—and amid shouts and scenes of Homeric laughter and gaiety waded through the water, which reached

Corps under Gen. Couch had moved no further than United States Ford, where it was directed to remain on the north bank of the Rappahannock till the turning column sweeping down the south bank should have uncovered United States Ford, when it was to cross and move also to Chancellorsville. This object was, of course, accomplished the moment the Rappahannock was crossed; and the same afternoon Couch threw a pontoon bridge over the Rappahannock, and marched on Chancellorsville, at which point the four corps bivouacked that night (Thursday, April 29). The same night, Gen. Hooker removed his headquarters to Chancellorsville. (12). He had secured a position which took in reverse Lee's entire fortified line, and held in his hand a puissant force of 50,000 men.

MAGNIFICENT MILITARY ACHIEVEMENT.
The remarkable success attending this movement of which Lee did not become aware till the Rappahannock had been crossed, was the result of a secrecy and a celerity of march new in the Army of the Potomac. To have marched a column of 50,000 men, laden with 60 pounds of baggage, and encumbered with artillery and trains, 37 miles in two days; to have bridged and crossed two streams, guarded by a vigilant enemy, with the loss of half a dozen men, one wagon, and two mules, is an achievement which has few parallels, and which well deserves to rank with Prince Eugene's famous passage of the Adige.

FREDERICKSBURG FEINT SUCCESSFUL.
In securing this result, important service was rendered by the skillful manner in which the flank march was masked by Gen. Sedgwick, under whom had been placed for the execution of this duty the First Corps (Reynolds) and the Third Corps (Sickles), in addition to his own Sixth Corps. As soon as the column destined to make the turning movement was well under way, Sedgwick was ordered to cross the river in the vicinity of Fredericksburg for the purpose of making a direct demonstration. Accordingly, before dawn of the 29th, while the flanking force was passing the Rappahannock 30 miles above, pontoon-bridges, borne noiselessly on men's shoulders, were launched three miles below the town, near the point at which Franklin had made his crossing on the evening of the battle of Fredericksburg. In this a party passed to the south bank, capturing the small force in observation. Two bridges were then constructed, and the main body of the army, this menace immediately inducing attention of the Confederates, who promptly began intrenching their entire front, as fearing a direct attack. (13). Demonstration

12. This place consisted of a single large brick house.

13. There was much in what was visible to the Confederates of Sedgwick's operation to inspire them with the belief that Hooker was preparing the main attack at that point; and an accidental circumstance, details of which are given below, tended greatly to confirm this impression. Being a spectator of Sedgwick's operations, I at the time interpreted certain movements as a ruse de guerre, designed to give the enemy an exaggerated notion of the strength of the force present at that point, whereas the necessary result of the operation was already passed into history; and Col. MacDougall, an English military writer of repute, following that account (without credit given, however), thus writes:

"The four remaining divisions of these two corps (Sedgwick's and Reynolds's) remained on the north bank, and an ingenious ruse was practiced to deceive the enemy into the belief that the greater part of the Northern army was there massed with the intention of crossing. It is to be noted that, from the configuration of the ground, the enemy could not see the bridges, neither could they see the four divisions on the north bank, which were behind the fringe of hills aforesaid. These troops were then put in motion, and, mounting the ridge, which, sloping both ways, served as a screen, marched along the top in full view of the Confederates, and then dipped down

not cross the Rappahannock till the morning of the 29th, and had thus far made very insufficient progress.

But, instead of "ingloriously flying," Lee preferred to "come out of his defenses" and give battle to Hooker; and, unhappily for that General, the circumstances under which he chose to receive battle, in place of insuring Lee's "certain destruction," as he had boasted, resulted in the disastrous rout of the Confederate army, the brilliant opening. Now, as these circumstances furnish the key to the right appreciation of the whole action, I shall, in the succeeding chapter, set them forth with some fullness of detail.

HOOKE'S COLLAPSE.
When, on Thursday night, Hooker had centered his four corps at Chancellorsville, the real character of the movement, which, up to that point, had been so admirably concealed from his antagonist, became fully disclosed. The Confederate leader saw that the demonstrations near Fredericksburg that had engaged his attention were but a mask, and that the turn of affairs called for the promptest action. Lee, with instant perception of the situation, now seized the masses of his force, and with the grasp of a Titan swung them into position as a giant might fling a mighty stone from a sling. (15). One division and one brigade of the division of Early and the brigade of Barksdale were intrusted with the duty of holding the heights of Fredericksburg; and, at midnight of Thursday, Jackson and McLane, and the rest of his divisions, recalled from Fredericksburg, and from far below Fredericksburg, were put in motion toward Chancellorsville to meet Hooker with a front of opposition, before he should be able, by advancing from Chancellorsville, to seize the direct Confederate communications with Richmond.

If the Confederate commander was able to effect this purpose, it was because the Union commander allowed him so to do; out of sight toward the bridges. Instead of crossing these, however, they turned back through a gully round the rear of the ridge, round again on the top, and again disappeared from sight to play the same game, just the same evolutions as is practiced by the "brave army" on the stage of a theater, and with the same intent of deceiving the spectators as to their numbers. The like stage effect was practiced by the artillery and wagon-train of the Confederate forces, which were intended to be the whole Northern army."—MacDougall: Modern Warfare and Modern Armies, pp. 324, 325.

The following note from Maj.-Gen. McMahon explains the real purpose of the operation misinterpreted by me:

New York, January, 1893.
My Dear Sir: The movement of troops under Gen. Sedgwick, to which our conversation referred, was not for the purpose of deceiving the enemy into the belief that the main attack would be made at that point, although such probably was its effect.

The movements consisted of the withdrawal of Reynolds's Corps from the lower end of the ridge, and the main body of the army, which was effected without attracting the attention of the enemy, the transfer of one division of the Sixth Corps from the upper to the lower bridges, and the position abandoned by the First Corps. The march of this division was so ordered that only its arrival at the lower bridges could be seen by the enemy. It was a necessary movement, made so by the departure of the First Corps for Chancellorsville, and not a stratagem. Of course, in this as in all similar movements, advantage was taken of the nature of the ground, to conceal our intention from the enemy as far as it was practicable.

Very respectfully, etc.,
M. T. McMAHON.
Late Chief of Staff to Maj.-Gen. Sedgwick.

14. These observations were made in presence of the writer.

15. "The enemy in our front (Sedgwick), near Fredericksburg, continued inactive; and it was now apparent that the main attack would be made upon our flank and rear. It was, therefore, determined to leave sufficient troops to hold our lines, and with the main body of the army, to give battle to the approaching column."—Lee: Report of Chancellorsville, p. 7.

(Continued on sixth page.)